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Abstract 
This paper investigates the process of developing and implementing Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) and industrial parks in Russia. Governments commonly use SEZ policies to develop 
and diversify exports, create jobs, and launch technology and knowledge sharing. The 
industrial cluster concept is based on the significance of rivalry and supplier networks within 
the cluster, the combination of geographical specificities and government policies that lead to 
innovation and productivity growth. This study reveals that, in Russia, the government’s 
approach in developing these initiatives has strongly interfered with business activities and 
prevented the vital competitive and collaborative behavior of firms within these economic 
zones.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Industrial cluster policies are key and widely used tools for economic development in local 
and regional economic development planning. Industrial clusters, i.e., groups of 
geographically proximate companies within a similar industry, are believed to enhance 
employment, diversify exports and transfer technology and managerial know-how. Crucial 
elements of the industrial cluster model include the provision of a collaborative and 
competitive environment, an appropriate geographical location and proximity to resources, 
related and supporting firms, and state regulations and strategic programs that facilitate 
innovation and productivity (Delgado et al., 2016; Feser et al., 2008; Ketels, 2013; Krugman, 
1991; Porter, 1990; Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999). 
The formation of industrial clusters is an important part of governmental policies and 
regional development in Russia. Some internationally competitive industrial zones originated 
in the former economic regime, such as conglomerates in the oil and gas sectors, the 
aluminum and airspace industries, and military and strategic defense (Romanova & 
Lavrikova, 2008). However, the stimulation of industrial clusters did not emerge until the 
early 2000s in the form of industrial parks in 2006 (Ablaev, 2015; Sandler & Kuznetsov, 
2015). Among the determining factors in 2005, President Putin signed a decree, No. 116-
Federal Law “Establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) in the Russian Federation”, 
which envisioned four types of SEZs: industrial, innovation, tourism, and port and logistics 
zones. This paper focuses predominantly on industrial SEZs, as industrial development is a 
core objective for the Russian economy. 
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SEZs and industrial parks are emerging in Russia around existing resources, especially 
research and development (R&D) and human resources. They have been created mostly in 
areas that have not only weak infrastructure and low production capacity but also the 
potential for economic growth. The Russian government has offered local and foreign 
investors various greenfield and brownfield projects in these zones, which are supported by 
incentives such as an established communal infrastructure, simplified “one-window” 
administrative procedures and low taxes (Maslikhina, 2016; Yankov et al., 2016). The 
emerging clusters are expected to generate large national corporations, thereby reducing 
import-dependency in strategic areas. However, SEZs and industrial parks have been 
generally established on the initiative of regional policymakers, who have little guidance 
from the federal government and little experience and knowledge. These policies are 
motivated by a desire to overcome particular political, economic or organizational challenges 
rather than being part of a coherent regional development plan. As a result, while some 
projects have developed as exemplars, most of them have struggled.  
This paper aims to investigate the implementation process of industrial cluster policies in 
Russian regions with SEZs and industrial parks. In doing so, it will fill a gap in the literature 
related to the establishment of SEZs and industrial parks in the Russian context. It thus 
investigates the operational impact of high levels of bureaucracy and state interference on 
business activities and the unique mindset of both state officials and entrepreneurs concerning 
managing business activities with proclaimed capitalist intent but a socialist mentality. The 
study has implications for policymakers not only in Russia but also in other developing 
countries. The paper is structured as follows. It begins with a review of the literature on the 
industrial cluster model and SEZs and industrial park policies in particular. This review is 
followed by a description of the methods used in the research and the findings. The last 
section concludes and presents some recommendations for further research.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Concept of Industrial Clusters  
The concept of industrial clusters originates with Marshall (2013), who used the term 
“Industrial Districts” (ID) to characterize the benefits gained by locating firms in the same 
geographical area. These benefits comprise access to three types of positive externalities: 
specialized workers, specialized suppliers of inputs and services, and technological and 
knowledge spillovers among co-located companies. Subsequently, these externalities have 
been noted to be generated not only by geographic proximity but also by sectoral, horizontal 
and vertical agglomerations in terms of the division of labor; all those involved benefit from 
the specialization that accompanies operating within the same industry, using the same set of 
resources, or occupying the same supply chain (Feser et al., 2008; Keeble & Nachum, 2002; 
Sonobe & Otsuka, 2006; Swords, 2013). Similarly, social, cultural and institutional 
“proximity” provide similar benefits (Becattini et al., 2003).  
Industrial clusters have three defining characteristics. The first is proximity: clusters are 
fostered by accessibility, which is generally considered in geographical terms at the level of a 
region or town. Another characteristic is value creation: clusters comprise distinct firms that 
are related to one another through the production of goods and services that are valued by 
customers. The third characteristic is the business environment: firms share a cluster-specific 
business environment that is generated by both individual actions and collaboration among 
companies, government agencies, universities and other organizations in what is sometimes 
described as an “innovation system” (Cooke, 2001; Feldman et al., 2005; Lechner & 
Dowling, 2003). The balance between collaboration and competition in the business 
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environment, which combines information exchange and specialization advantages, is a 
critical determinant of an industrial cluster’s innovative capacity and, in turn, its members’ 
competitiveness (Porter, 1990).  
Clusters improve industrial competitiveness through product specialization and enhance 
collective efficiency through business value chains and reduced transaction costs. 
Additionally, firms within clusters foster a high degree of networking and interconnections 
that encourage knowledge and technology spillovers, thus stimulating productivity and 
innovation (Maskell, 2001; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Such enterprises can obtain a self-
sustaining dynamic result from a robust reasonable advantage in a specific range of products 
and services. Knowledge spillovers and close interactions with customers and other 
companies, venture capitalists and knowledge-intensive service providers generate more new 
ideas and provide intense pressure to innovate, while the cluster environment reduces the 
costs of experimenting. Business formation is expected to be higher within clusters. Start-ups 
are more dependent on external suppliers and partners within the cluster (Feldman et al., 
2005; Wennberg & Lindqvist, 2007). New opportunities have been created for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) when multi-national enterprises (MNEs) start to do less of 
their work in-house, preferring to delegate some of their activities to specialist sub-
contractors. Small manufacturers work more efficiently in a geographically clustered 
environment and are assisted by supporting organizations that stimulate information 
exchanges (De Marchi & Grandinetti, 2014).  
Industrial clusters are fostered by externalities of different types, supplier relationships, 
and the utilization of common factor inputs, such as specialized labor markets or knowledge-
sharing processes. When some of these positive externalities occur naturally, their dynamics 
can be furthered through a combination of networking, collaboration and competition (Best, 
2001; Delgado et al., 2014). However, not all economic activities lead to clusters. For some 
companies within a certain industry, the need to be close to the potential market is more 
essential than the possible benefits of being geographically close to other companies in the 
same field. In these circumstances, companies do not compete across regions, and they are 
not directly exposed to competitors, who can draw on the business environment and cluster 
conditions elsewhere. For the firms in other industries, the cluster benefits are more vital than 
proximity to the market. In these circumstances, competition is based not only on complex 
internal business strategies and operational practices but also on the skills and assets that they 
can obtain from the location of their activities (Dunning & Narula, 2005; Ketels & 
Memedovic, 2008; Porter, 2003).  
Clusters survive and succeed predominantly because they can increase the diversity and 
sophistication of their business activities to attain greater productivity and efficiency. In an 
export-led growth model, this capability is particularly significant. It includes efficiency 
achievements and reduced entry barriers through business value chains, production 
specialization and division of labor; efficient local state support; knowledge, technology, and 
skill spillovers through inter-firm relations, including those with state-owned enterprises and 
foreign corporations; entrepreneurial initiatives and social networks; innovation and 
technology support from knowledge and public organizations and from industrial associations 
(Boja, 2011; Delgado et al., 2016; Porter, 2003; Porter, 1990; Swann & Prevezer, 1996).   
Some authors suggest that industrial clusters spontaneously develop (Brusco, 1982; 
Delgado et al., 2014; Ketels, 2013; Schmitz & Musyck, 2016), when the interaction of market 
forces causes cluster growth by combining rich craft-skilled labor and benefiting from social 
and institutional capital. Other researchers stress the significance of the role of national and 
international government policies (Bianchi, 2000; Cowling & Sugden, 1999; Parrilli, 2009). 
In particular, they suggest that cluster development is not spontaneous; instead, it occurs due 
to the implementation of national laws and initiatives to facilitate the development of SMEs 
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and support their competitive progress. The cluster’s success significantly depends on the 
robustness of the government’s strategy for upgrading competitiveness. The government 
should be open to providing support to all emerging clusters that show a willingness to 
cooperate and that have some assets on which to build. It also should be engaged in cluster 
initiatives as a facilitator and participant—not as a leader. The most successful cluster 
initiatives stem from public–private partnerships (PPPs). According to Porter (1990), the 
government should not provide subsidies, protection or the relaxation of competition laws to 
develop clusters, which is even more important in countries that have less experience with 
competition in their domestic markets.  
2.2 Special Economic Zones and Industrial Parks 
The concept of a SEZ is not novel. Its early, simpler version can be traced back to economic 
districts, which were later extended to a free trade format or export-processing zones. Since 
the 1960s, many countries, particularly in Asia, have used zones of this type to break away 
from an import-substitution development strategy and to promote export-driven economic 
growth. However, most of these zones predominantly specialized in one or more type of 
export-oriented economic activity, ranging from bonded warehouses, export assembling, 
processing, and border trade to transportation and financial services. Others have been 
explicitly established to facilitate technology transfer and promote R&D, as in the case of hi-
tech development zones and scientific parks. Most SEZs are either associated or co-located 
with ports (Creskoff & Walkenhorst, 2009; Farole, 2011; Kirk, 2014).    
SEZ is a general definition that covers recent iterations of traditional commercial zones. 
The basic concept of the SEZ reflects several specific characteristics (Akinci & Crittle, 
2008):  its territory is geographically demarcated, which has a single administration, it offers 
tax benefits within this area, provides an autonomous customs zone with simplified 
procedures and duty-free benefits, and offers more liberal economic and juridical regulations 
than those in the rest of the country.  
SEZs are geographic concentrations of firms. They are created to provide better 
infrastructure and R&D, and they offer various fiscal incentives that are not found outside the 
zones. They are often established by direct industrial policy interventions to promote regional 
economic growth, where state policy offers incentives to attract anchor investors and other 
firms to the same location (Aggarwal, 2010; Gupta, 2008). Examples include high-
technology parks, science parks, industrial zones/parks, export-processing zones, free trade 
zones, free ports, and single factory zones (Akinci & Crittle, 2008). 
The industrial park is a territory zoned and planned for industrial development. It is 
commonly located in the suburbs or completely outside a city’s residential areas, but it has 
well-developed transportation connections, such as roads and railways. This concept is 
predominantly based on the following ideas (Geng & Hengxin, 2009; Ratinho & Henriques, 
2010): establishing the necessary infrastructure in a specifically restricted territory reduces 
certain expenses for businesses (e.g., roads, rail sidings, electricity, water, and gas); the 
distant localization of industrial zones decreases their environmental impact on urban areas.  
Murphy and Baldwin (1959) made the first attempt to define the industrial park, 
suggesting that it had three features. First, industrial parks must enforce mandatory 
restrictions on the firms within its walls, including minimum and maximum lot sizes and 
land-use ratios, industry types, and environmental standards. The park has to be zoned 
correctly and regulated by private agreements. Second, an industrial park should employ a 
management organization to enforce restrictions, approve new firms, regulate private 
agreements and supervise their fulfilment. An industrial park cannot use a single-firm 
development model. Third, the park must be some form of planned industrial district. To 
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ensure the project’s success, it must provide detailed planning for the territory that accounts 
for all necessary utilities for each site, including water, electricity, gas, sewage, and transport 
infrastructure (i.e., access to highways and railways). In 1985, Arlesh divided industrial parks 
into three groups: research parks, innovation centers and science parks (Moudi & 
Hajihosseini, 2011). Some research suggests that the industrial park is a sub-type of the free 
trade zone (FTZ) or the SEZ, i.e., a smaller version that is specifically designed for SMEs 
(Akinci & Crittle, 2008; Farole, 2011; Meng, 2003; Sandler & Kuznetsov, 2015; Shaw & 
Yeoh, 2000). Some authors combine the definitions for technology or science parks (Liberati 
et al., 2016; Phillimore, 1999; Sun et al., 2007), while others suggest that an industrial park is 
merely a “heavyweight” version of a business or office park (Behera et al., 2012; Frej & 
Gause, 2001; Moore & Jennings, 1993). In this paper, an industrial park is considered an SEZ 
sub-type because the Russian government has deliberately and specifically initiated the 
establishment of industrial parks for SMEs and SEZs for MNEs.  
As the foundations of SEZ and industrial park models correspond with the concept of 
industrial cluster development, they have to pursue the following objectives to progress: 
cooperation and competition, knowledge exchange and innovations, interactions with outside 
firms and technology exchange, production and export diversification, new start-ups, and the 
emergence of other supplementary industries (Bräutigam & Tang, 2014; Hsu et al., 2013; 
Landingin & Wadley, 2005; Nel & Rogerson, 2014; Zeng, 2012). Despite the growth of SEZs 
worldwide, many have failed to fulfill their objectives, such as employment growth and 
export diversification. SEZ policy and management practices have progressed over time 
(Aggarwal, 2010; Gupta, 2008). Many successful SEZs have changed their foundation of 
competitiveness, concentrating on service quality rather than counting on fiscal incentives. 
These factors were ultimately vital in determining the differences between successful and 
failing economic zones (Farole, 2011; Kirk, 2014). Formulating policies for a functioning 
zone is much easier than bring it into existence. If the development of SEZ is not complex, 
then it may not lead to expected results concerning adequate tax profits, as they are very low. 
Fiscal incentives can play a vital role in attracting investments in the short term, especially 
during the initial stages of zone development. Nevertheless, they have an insufficient impact 
on long-term success: no significant correlation exists between fiscal incentives (particularly 
tax holidays) and outcomes (Akinci & Crittle, 2008; Shakya, 2009).  
SEZs are created to ease serviced land and infrastructural complexity that may prevent 
investment inflow into regional or national economies by providing potential investors with 
access to prebuilt manufacturing sites, necessary utilities (e.g., electricity, water, 
telecommunications, and sewage), and long-term leases. SEZs also facilitate the 
administrative procedures associated with business registration, license acquisition, and 
access to key services, such as utilities and construction. They provide so-called “single-
window” or “one-stop” services, meaning that their management takes full responsibility for 
coordinating all administrative procedures. Lastly, an essential component of the 
administrative services provided by zones is customs administration, which is commonly 
offered with fiscal incentives, with a customs officer inside or at the gate of the zone to 
perform customs clearance to speed up import and export operations (Aggarwal, 2010; 
Akinci & Crittle, 2008; Cheesman, 2012; Farole, 2011; Kirk, 2014; Shakya, 2009; 
Tolmachev, Zhoga, Aleynikova, & Legkaya, 2011).  
The management of SEZs and industrial parks, along with other public authorities, is 
responsible for attracting investors and creating networks to promote such zones and, in turn, 
stimulate their growth. Additionally, most successful zones use an anchor investor strategy, 
where high-profile companies are invited to join at the initial stages of zone creation, thereby 
signaling the zone’s solidity to other potential investors and stressing this factor to provide 
them with a useful network of suppliers and partners. Commonly, with this strategy, SEZ 
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authorities strive to attract well-known MNEs in certain industries (Aggarwal, 2010; Basile & 
Germidis, 1984; Farole, 2011; Gupta, 2008; Tyler & Negrete, 2009). In Russia, the 
government has played a vital role in the creation of SEZs and industrial parks because its 
initial aim was to resolve problems concerning the improvement of the investment climate 
and weak governance rather than to overcome economic and legal limitations in trade 
operations (Barkhatova, 2000; Tolmachev et al., 2011).   
3. METHODOLOGY 
This paper investigates the implementation and development processes of industrial clusters 
in Russia by analyzing SEZs and industrial parks. These issues have not been previously 
explored and analyzed, as they are relatively new. First, the researcher undertook a 
documentary analysis that reviewed the established procedure, scope and geographic 
locations of SEZs and industrial parks in Russia. Data were collected from the official 
government websites of SEZs and the Association of Industrial Parks (AIPs) in Russia, which 
included zone descriptions, various presentations and financial reports. Second, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with the managers of five SEZs (Titanium Valley SEZ, 
Alabuga SEZ, Lipetsk SEZ, Togliatti SEZ and Moglino SEZ), three tenants from two of these 
SEZs, and two representatives from the AIPs. Primary data collection was conducted in two 
stages: December 2014–January 2015 and January-February 2016. Overall, twenty in-depth 
interviews lasted one to two hours each. Twelve interviews were face-to-face meetings that 
took place at the managers’ offices, and eight were telephone interviews. To obtain the most 
relevant information about the targeted organizations, only top management had been 
reached: general directors, deputy directors and research managers. The SEZ investors 
belonged to the following industry sectors: titan production, the production of components 
and equipment for metallurgy and mechanical engineering, and the manufacturing of plastics, 
rubber, and chemicals. Interviews were conducted in Russian and subsequently examined and 
translated into English.  
In this study, the researcher has composed three types of interview questions for three 
groups of respondents: SEZ administrators, SEZ investors, and AIPs representatives. The 
interview questions have been composed according to the relevant eight themes. The themes 
have been identified as the result of the literature review analysis, which revealed the most 
significant topics that required deeper investigation. Sections 1 and 2 were introductory and 
inquired the data about the establishing process of the SEZ or industrial park, some aspects of 
the managing companies and information about the tenants. Section 3 concentrated on the 
market topic specifically emphasising the linkages with other tenants within the economic 
zones and the enquiry about export-oriented activities. These two aspects were essential to 
investigate according to the concept of industrial clusters suggesting the importance of trade 
or cooperative linkages within the clusters (Delgado et al., 2016; Ketels & Memedovic, 2008; 
Porter, 2003), and significance of export-oriented activities within the SEZs that facilitated 
sustainable development (Aggarwal, 2010; Akinci & Crittle, 2008; Zeng, 2012). Sections 4-6 
were based on the cluster theory that suggested the importance of three factors (competition, 
cooperation, and innovation) for facilitating the development of the clusters (Breschi & 
Malerba, 2005; Delgado et al., 2014; Ketels, 2013; Porter, 2000). Section 7 investigated the 
significance of the regional government in the development of the zones (Aggarwal, 2006, 
2010; Chen, 1994; Ge, 1999), and about Russian business realities: perception of competition 
as a threat, resistance towards knowledge sharing processes, and over-reliance on the state 
(Ivanov, 2016; Kuznetsova & Roud, 2014; Tsygankov, 2014). The last Section 8 inquired the 
general data about success and prevent factors for sustainable development according to the 
views and perceptions of the respondents within the specific SEZs and industrial parks.  
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Respondents required not to disclose their names, positions or connections of their 
organizations in this study, nor any possible signs and associations that could potentially 
reveal this information. Responses were gathered and merged according to their groups (i.e., 
SEZ administrators, SEZ investors and AIPs representatives); patterns have been identified 
and compared. This approach is descriptive in nature; therefore, the information derived from 
the interviews cannot be found in available open-source documents and the Internet. All the 
data obtained from the interviews has been estimated as highly valuable.  The results of this 
study are presented jointly to preserve the respondents’ anonymity. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Administration of SEZs 
After President Putin signed the decree No. 116-Federal Law “Establishment of special 
economic zones in the Russian Federation” in 2005, which referred to the creation of four 
types of SEZs, many regions had applied to establish these projects on their territory. A 
regional governor or a group of state officials or ministers could apply. However, only two 
regions obtained permission to create SEZs: the Tatarstan Republic and the Lipetsk region. 
Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development has been managing the SEZ project since then. 
A few essential elements played a vital role in winning this competition: the regions’ 
financial strength, their industrial capacity, and their recognition as appropriate locations 
from an economic perspective. The biggest problem for Russian business is its remoteness 
from borders and customs; thus, location is a key element. Transport costs in Russia play a 
vital role in the product’s final price. The respondents mentioned the possibility of personal 
networks and warm relationships between the regional and federal government during the 
selection of pioneering regions for SEZs.  
The federal government created a public organization in the form of a joint-stock company 
based in Moscow—the headquarters of the SEZ’s administration—and subsidiaries across the 
country, so-called “managing companies” that are responsible for establishing and 
developing their projects in different regions. These managing companies have not been 
initiated to gain profits; instead, they have been established to attract investors, prepare the 
necessary infrastructure for them, and supervise the functionality of this infrastructure and the 
project in general. Although it is a joint-stock company, 100% of the shares belong to the 
government. Therefore, SEZs are entirely owned by the state. Managing companies usually 
profit from investors’ payments to use the SEZ infrastructure (e.g., electricity, water, sewage, 
and recycling). However, they keep all the profits gained from infrastructure rent in the 
regional budget, and they do not share them with the federal office. The federal SEZ 
organization in Moscow merely monitors regional SEZs to ensure that they stick to the 
schedule for establishing and developing the project. The Moscow headquarters acts as an 
intermediary between regional SEZs and the Ministry of Economic Development, which 
monitors the efficiency and development of these projects. In the early stages, regional 
managing companies and SEZs are financed by the state budget, but they are expected to 
become self-sufficient in the long term. The financial structure of the SEZ project is mixed: 
the federal government sponsors about half of the funding, and the other half is provided by 
the regional government. 
The respondents denied the possibility of private investors managing SEZ projects for 
several reasons. First, an immense budget is required to finance the launch of this project. 
Second, even if the project is privately initiated, it can lead the investor to increase 
infrastructure rent and result in the exclusion of tax benefits, which has been observed in 
industrial parks. However, the respondents suggested that, at the government level, only 
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attempts to create SEZs on a private basis were discussed. Federal Law No. 398 “The criteria 
for establishment of special economic zones” (26 April 2012) provides the list of 
requirements that every region must meet in their application to obtain the right to establish 
an SEZ, including a description of the potential territory, a list of the necessary infrastructure, 
the region’s industrial capacity, and a general business plan. Although the government 
initiated the SEZ project, a few private organizations could have facilitated applications to the 
Ministry of Economic Development by expressing an interest in establishing their companies 
in the zone after it was created. A group of experts on the federal level evaluates such 
applications and then makes a decision. Who is included in this group of experts is unclear. 
Information is vague, referring, for instance, to managers from various ministry departments 
and economists. While making its decision, the group considers the region’s general strategic 
development program, including the potential collaboration of existing companies in the area 
with the companies in the SEZ.  
The Ministry of Economic Development monitors SEZs’ efficiency annually. The Federal 
Law No. 491 “Criteria for evaluating the performance of special economic zones” (10 June 
2013) describes how an SEZ’s managing company is examined. Among the many criteria, 
the most important ones are presented below:  
 The amount of FDI attracted to the project; 
 The number of new investors emerged in the zone; 
 The number of newly created workplaces;  
 The amount of SEZ companies’ revenues;  
 The amount of tax paid;  
 The coefficient between investments in the project by the state and by private 
investors.  
 
Notably, sanctions are not enacted if the managing company produces unsatisfactory 
results. The respondents claimed that the Ministry of Economic Development had never been 
very unsatisfied with any SEZ’s results; thus, no sanctions had been applied. In the worst-
case scenario, a SEZ closure is impossible, as the contract agreements between the investors 
and the regional government have been signed for a long-term perspective. Nevertheless, the 
federal government has the right to alter the SEZ’s management. 
The process of preparing the infrastructure varies across different SEZs. The managing 
companies suggested that this variance could be one reason why some SEZs had developed 
more intensively than others. The current success model, as well as international experience, 
suggests that infrastructure should be created first to attract investors (Aggarwal, 2010; 
Gupta, 2008; Tantri, 2015; Wang, 2013). Nonetheless, few SEZs have attempted to attract 
investors first or receive primary contractual obligations; only later have they begun to build 
the necessary infrastructure. One respondent claimed the following:  
 
“We cannot build the infrastructure first. This approach does not suit our realities. What 
happens if we prepare the infrastructure for the entire SEZ territory and don’t manage to 
attract all the investors straight away? Who is going to cover the costs of unused areas? We 
need to get initial contractual obligations from investor that show serious intentions and 
financial capacity for this project. Afterwards, we start establishing the infrastructure on a 
certain delimited area particularly for this investor.“ 
 
As a result, investors did not display much interest in these projects. In some cases, an 
SEZ began preparing an infrastructure for a specific investor while it was building its factory 
on site. In relation to the fulfillment of contractual obligations, the government guaranteed 
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financial support for the project. Regional policymakers also ensured the fulfilment of 
contractual obligations, which helped create healthy relationships with investors.  
Investors go through a particular assessment procedure before being accepted in the zone. 
Once the company shows an interest in establishing its business in the zone, it submits an 
application with its business plan. All the requirements are written in the federal law No. 116 
“Establishment of special economic zones in the Russian Federation”. Among the many 
requirements, several are stressed: the amount of money to be invested over a certain period, 
the number of workplaces that will be created, ecological standards, and industry and 
infrastructure specifications. A group of experts in the regional and federal governments 
assess this application. After the government approves the application, a company must 
invest at least 1.8 million dollars in the project, and 600,000 dollars should be invested in first 
three years. As such, both sides of the agreement have contractual obligations.  
The SEZs are promoted in different ways in Russia. First, the governor and his colleagues 
promote their SEZ projects at the meetings with foreign or regional partners. Second, 
managing companies—in collaboration with the Department of International Affairs and 
Regional Development, which is the part of Ministry of Economic Development—organize 
international meetings, conferences, and exhibitions with similar organizations in other 
countries. Additionally, when investors penetrate the Russian market and plan to locate their 
businesses in an EZ, they usually contact state institutions to obtain information and 
consultations about free zones in Russia. In some cases, investors conduct research to 
determine a suitable location for their businesses. SEZ investors have commonly been found 
through the personal networks of the regional governors, or they were successful companies 
in the region that planned to expand. Some respondents suggested that a correlation existed 
between the regional government’s promotional activity and the SEZ’s success:  
 
“There was a situation, when a big investor required a personal meeting with the regional 
governor before locating its factory in a certain SEZ, but the governor refused, explaining 
that these sorts of activities were not necessary and a waste of his time. State managers from 
different region heard about this, came to invite the investor to their SEZs, and provided 
personal meetings with their regional governors. As a result, this investor located its business 
in their SEZ.” 
 
All the managing companies noted that no real competition existed among SEZs in Russia. 
They compete to some degree, but every economic zone is unique due to its industrial, 
economic, and geographical specificities. SEZs are relatively geographically distant from one 
another and thus cover their own regional markets. Moreover, no competition exists between 
the tenants in the zones for the following reasons. First, the concept of two SEZs was to 
create supply chain cooperation to a certain extent. Other zones attract various investors from 
different industries, but according to the federal law requirements. Second, when an 
investor’s application is assessed by a group of experts before it is fully accepted in the zone, 
the experts consider the industry type and if organization’s goals are in line with regional 
interests regarding strategic development. In other words, both the managing company and 
regional state officials attempt to avoid a competitive environment by refusing investors who 
operate in the same industry as the existing companies in the SEZ and the region. The 
respondents stated that they had not had to directly refuse an investor because investors 
usually did not want to come to a zone where their potential competitors already operated: 
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“If we bring competing companies into our SEZ, it will be chaos. Can you image what 
would happen? Despite the fact that we haven’t faced such situations yet, when companies 
from similar industry segments plan to establish themselves in our SEZ, we still try to avoid 
this.“ 
 
The only form of competition within the SEZs is for qualified specialists and managers. 
According to respondents, industrial parks do not compete with SEZs. These projects offer 
different benefits. Moreover, industrial parks might provide an additional opportunity for 
investors to establish their businesses in the same region. If both types of clusters operate in 
the same regions, they are commonly managed by one government organization. In terms of 
the collaborative environment, as mentioned above, two of the SEZs were created based on 
the supply-chain concept. Others attract any companies from different industries, but 
according to the requirements of the federal law. However, even in supply-chain SEZs, the 
number of companies involved in cooperative networks is relatively low, for instance, three 
of four companies, which is similar to free zones that did not claim a supply-chain concept. 
Therefore, the collaborative environment surrounding these SEZs is lacking.  
The six industrial SEZs have already had primary positive effects: attracting FDI in these 
projects and the regional economy; increasing employment, enhancing the region’s 
infrastructure and production capacity, and launched minor collaborative activities between 
companies inside and outside the SEZ. The creation of one workplace within the SEZ leads to 
the creation of four to five workplaces outside the SEZ. Investors predominantly pull 
employees from the local population, though they employ a small percentage of foreign staff. 
All respondents report key factors that can stimulate the SEZ’s sustainable development. The 
first key factor is the country’s general investment climate because countries compete to 
attract new investors. The second essential factor is the financial capacity of both the local 
government and investors, which is an essential consideration for the project’s success. 
4.2 SEZ tenants 
One respondent was an anchor investor, i.e., the first enterprise to come to the SEZ to create 
supply-chain collaboration. This company had already been established in proximity of the 
SEZ for many decades and had planned to create a subsidiary in the zone, which was located 
near its parent company. Financial benefits were another important reason that this investor 
came to the SEZ (e.g., a duty-free zone and various tax benefits). Additionally, this company 
cooperated with the local government to create an SEZ in the region. However, the process of 
establishing this SEZ took many years because of the lack of activity by regional 
policymakers. Some companies came to the SEZ because of personal contacts in this zone, 
which facilitated the bureaucratic procedures required to register the company. Other reasons, 
such as financial benefits and product market share in the region, may play a secondary role. 
Some firms plan to import raw materials from abroad, which means that the duty-free 
customs regime will be beneficial. Additionally, proximity to the anchor investor is perceived 
as an additional benefit for product realization, although it is not a crucial factor. The main 
problem for investors in the selection of SEZs for their businesses was the lack of trust in the 
local government and managing companies, which did not negotiate or provide guarantees 
regarding the timely preparation of infrastructure. In addition, constantly changing rules and 
laws and complex legislation in Russia also contributed to this distrust. The tenants stressed 
the importance of built infrastructure, as infrastructure preparation played a vital role in the 
selection of SEZs in Russia. If the company plans to build infrastructure on its own, it must 
complete complicated and time-consuming procedures to obtain the necessary approvals and 
signatures from state officials. One respondent commented as follows: 
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“Key factors for the successful development of SEZs are not connected with its model, but 
with the general economic policies of the country, which include time-consuming sequential 
bureaucratic procedures, complex juridical regulations, huge construction costs, etc. Most of 
the time, state officials make incompetent decisions, as they do not bear any real 
responsibility. All these factors make Russia unattractive for investment: if you are not 
competitive in your investment costs, you do not invest. The Russian market is not big enough 
for sales. Reduced import barriers are good, but, because of the large volume of work 
required to establish the business, Russia becomes uncompetitive even for export-oriented 
operations”.  
 
The tenants agreed that they did not experience a competitive environment inside or 
outside the SEZ. Competitors are located in other regions or even in other countries. Due to 
the enormous size of Russia, every region is perceived as a different market (Brown & Earle, 
2000; Tsukhlo, 2007). Moreover, the respondents added that investors commonly try to avoid 
SEZs where their competitors are already operating. Additionally, managing companies try to 
avoid attracting companies from similar market segments. This avoidance reflects cultural 
aspects of Russia, where companies try to prevent competition in every possible way, while 
foreign businesses perceive competition as a motivating factor or a stimulus (Michailova & 
Husted, 2003; Orlov, 2013; Shastitko et al., 2009):  
 
“Innovation will come when there are a lot of companies working in the same area and they 
start to collaborate. It is too early; now there is no need. But innovation also comes when 
there is competition. You do not find any competition among Russian companies, and they do 
not tend to innovate. This is what the state does not understand. This is the main issue that 
the government refuses to understand: competition is good. Our managing companies tell us 
that they do not bring competitors to our SEZ, but we say that we do not care because our 
company is competitive. That is the difference: competition for foreigners is sport; for 
Russians, it is threat.”  
 
In supply-chain SEZs, some c expect to collaborate with all members of the SEZ in the 
long term, but, in the meantime, they do not have such opportunities due to the absence of 
potential partners and the zone’s immaturity. Companies that collaborated with other 
members of the SEZ claimed that it had happened on its own: the first investor simply joined 
the cluster; the other two noticed the location of the first one and chose the same zone to 
benefit from their proximate location to one another. Additionally, the respondents stressed 
the importance of the anchor investor in leading and directing the entire SEZ: small 
companies that collaborate with the anchor firm will follow its lead. 
 
Financial benefits of the SEZ stimulate the development of its companies, particularly in 
the early phases of the company’s activity. Duty-free customs benefits are predominantly 
utilized for import procedures, as few businesses in Russian SEZs are export-oriented. 
Despite fiscal incentives, the most important factor for a company’s growth is still connected 
to the market sales. The respondents also claimed that, because of high state interference in 
business activities in Russia due to bureaucracy and state officials' insufficient knowledge 
regarding the management of business processes, Russia is always one step behind other 
competitive nations or is simply slower in its development than other countries. 
Consequently, the development of SEZ projects and, in turn, of companies located within 
SEZs is slowed. Political stability, the country’s general investment climate and regional 
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government activity in attracting investors and promoting SEZ projects are also significant 
factors.  
4.3 Association of Industrial Parks in Russia 
Russia inherited many industrial zones and manufacturers after the collapse of the USSR, and 
many organizations have not managed to survive in the market economy since then. The 
federal government decided to create industrial parks in two possible forms. One was merely 
a greenfield project, where the necessary infrastructure (e.g., gas, electricity, and sewage) was 
provided, but the investor was expected to build the real-estate infrastructure. Another form 
was a brownfield project, where the old infrastructure of a derelict industrial area was 
transformed into a business park. Primary industrial parks in Russia were state-owned 
projects that appeared in the 2006.  
This concept was estimated to be an essential tool for resolving the problem of economic 
development. The industrial park was not widely used in Russia because of the lack of 
necessary funding, legal regulations, and general information about this model. Nevertheless, 
some regions were pioneers in implementing these initiatives. The turning point was the 
decree No. 59 of 16 February 2010, which suggested the term “manufacturing park,” 
clarifying its meaning as a number of real estate units (such as manufacturing, administration, 
logistics, warehouses, and other facilities necessary for production activities) that are 
managed by a single company, with a territory of no less than 10 hectares and a basic 
infrastructure for efficient functioning of SMEs (e.g., water, electricity, gas, and sewage). By 
2009, industrial parks had been established in 15 regions of Russia, and by 2015 in 48 
regions. The Tatarstan Republic and the Moscow, Leningrad, and Kaluga regions were 
actively implementing this economic tool. Businesses of any industry sectors can establish 
their production sites in industrial parks; however, they should still comply with the 
regulations based on the Federal Law No. 488 “About the Industrial Policy in the Russian 
Federation” (31.12.2014). Some projects failed in develop. The key reasons behind their 
failure were the lack of political activity and funding in the region, which are crucial for the 
establishment of industrial parks.  
The scenario was the same as the creation of SEZs. Regional governments used the 
industrial park to attract investors to the region. Local governments and other state officials 
played a significant role in building warm relationships with major investors and provided 
substantial financial support for the project. The federal government does not have any direct 
control over these regional industrial parks, as these projects are entirely initiated and 
sponsored by regional governments. In some cases, the federal government has provided 
financial support for certain industrial parks, but such actions were based merely on personal 
favor and networks between particular state officials in the regional and federal 
administration. Additionally, state-owned industrial parks offer few regional tax benefits to 
investors. The respondents stressed the importance of the regional government in developing 
industrial park initiatives:  
 
“Basically, the regional government plays a crucial role in establishing industrial parks in 
their region. It is not only about funding, but bringing MNEs into the region through 
personal networks, which subsequently help attract other good investors to the park. A good 
example can be Kaluga region, in which the regional governor managed to attract several 
huge investors to its industrial parks, such as Volkswagen, L’Oréal, Continental, Samsung, 
etc. As a result, it greatly facilitated the development of industrial parks in the Kaluga region, 
boosted the local economy and improved the general investment climate.” 
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Private industrial parks started to emerge in 2008–2009 as predominantly brownfield 
projects due to construction costs. The typical scenario was that the owner of an industrial 
area or a factory with unprofitable financial activities had decided to transform it into an 
industrial zone for more prosperous purposes. In the case of greenfield projects, the model is 
similar to SEZs as well: investors pay rent for the utilization of communal infrastructure, but 
they do not own the actual land. In brownfield projects, investors pay rent for both the 
communal infrastructure and the real estate. In some cases, companies have the opportunity 
to redeem the real estate or even the land on which they are established, although this is not a 
common phenomenon. Both state- and privately owned industrial parks have managing 
companies that are similar to those in the SEZ model, which are responsible for, among other 
things, monitoring the parks’ efficiency, searching for investors, receiving payments from 
investors, and looking after the park’s territory. State-owned industrial parks occasionally 
hire private organizations to manage their clusters, but the project remains under state control 
and supervision. The respondents also reported that the entire industrial park project lacked 
juridical support and regulations, which was commonly discussed. In 2015, the federal 
government signed the decree No. 794 “Industrial parks and the managing companies of 
industrial parks” (4 August 2015), which clarified industrial parks, their characteristics, their 
rules for creation and the general national standards. 
Similar to the SEZs, industrial parks are promoted in different ways. The regional 
government supports state-owned projects at various international events, conferences, and 
exhibitions. The managing companies organize meetings with foreign colleagues, as they 
have a solid financial basis for doing so. The situation is a little bit different for private parks. 
Although state officials claim that they also promote private industrial parks, in reality, these 
projects attempt to survive on their own, searching for investors and operating independently 
without any additional financial support. The key factor that attracts investors to the industrial 
parks is the established infrastructure that reduces investment costs. Industrial parks in 
different regions compete a bit for investors, but such competition is not essential. From the 
perspective of managing companies, an investor’s selection of a park is primarily a game of 
chance. No competition exists between firms within the parks. As in SEZs, investors do not 
want to come to a park where their competitors operate; managing companies or regional 
administration do not attract companies from the same industry sector. However, companies 
do compete for qualified labor, though it is not a widespread practice in the supply-chain 
networks within industrial parks. Most parks consist of companies that are randomly 
established; they come from different industries without any concrete structure or policy.  
Industrial parks have already attracted many investments, increased employment and 
improved the economic situation of the regions in general. However, these projects tend to 
appear only in the western part of Russia because of the developed markets there. The federal 
government is striving to change the situation and to establish parks in the eastern part of the 
country. However, such efforts have thus far been unsuccessful, as companies do not see the 
potential for business growth in those regions. The basic rules of markets dominate here. 
Moreover, the government shows a lack of financial support for private industrial parks. 
Entrepreneurs have claimed that the circumstances are unfair because state industrial parks 
have received more support than private ones. Moreover, regional governments more 
intensively promote state-owned industrial parks. However, the government claims that it 
provides financial support for all projects through special banking lending programs. 
However, entrepreneurs are not satisfied with these programs, as they involve time-
consuming and complicated bureaucratic procedures and the financial support is generally 
inadequate. Some businesses claim that, given the high rents and high costs within industrial 
parks, operating inside and outside the parks does not differ significantly.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article aims to examine the implementation and development processes of industrial 
clusters in Russia by analyzing SEZs and industrial parks. According to the literature about 
the establishment and development models for SEZs and industrial parks, they vary in 
different countries; however, certain patterns exist. Countries worldwide have launched FTZ 
projects to pursue similar aims: to attract FDI; increase employment, knowledge and 
technology exchanges; create innovations; increase the competitiveness of the economy 
(locally and internationally); and diversify exports, among other aims (Akinci & Crittle, 
2008; Farole, 2011; Gupta, 2008; Kirk, 2014; Tantri, 2015; Wang, 2013; Zeng, 2012). 
Governments produce and adjust local laws to create more attractive conditions for investors. 
The basic idea is to reduce the number of bureaucratic procedures and to make the processes 
of registering and starting a business even quicker. Moreover, the structure of most SEZ 
projects involved the infrastructure being initially built entirely for investors before 
attempting to attract them to the free zone. In other countries, particularly those in Southeast 
Asia, the economic zone is typically created entirely in advance before attracting investors 
(Cheesman, 2012; Chen, 1993; Gupta, 2008; Tantri, 2015). 
In Russia, some aspects are different. First, although the “one-window” model has been 
created both in SEZs and industrial parks, the registration process and launch of the business 
remains complicated. As a result, the procedures have not been simplified; thus, investors are 
not attracted to the zone. Second, in the early stages of establishing the SEZs in Russia, the 
infrastructure was not created, and the zone’s administration strove to attract the investors to 
practically empty territories, promising the fulfillment of future obligations. The investor was 
expected to construct the manufacturing site and create the real estate for its business, and the 
managing company simultaneously started building the necessary infrastructure specifically 
for that investor. This uncertainty did not inspire investors to come to the zones because of 
the high risk of the nonfulfillment of contractual obligations. The “Russian approach” might 
partly explain the inefficient development of the economic zones; however, this question 
should be further investigated. Moreover, when the first SEZs and industrial parks were 
created, the juridical system had not been addressed such initiatives yet. For example, 
“Lipetsk” and “Alabuga” SEZs were pioneers that experienced all possible challenges, such 
as import-export duty-free procedures, tax payments, cooperation issues, and an investor 
seeking procedures. Even now, many gaps in jurisdiction still prevent the sustainable 
development of economic zones in Russia.  
The choice to penetrate a particular economic zone is based on a number of key factors, 
such as proximity to resources, tax benefits, the potential of cooperation with other 
companies inside and outside the zone, and labor resources (Aggarwal, 2010; Moberg, 2015; 
Wang, 2013). Investors come to industrial economic zones in Russia for similar reasons—to 
be close to potential markets and to reduce production costs by locating manufacturing sites 
close to these markets and resources. The managing companies’ representatives mentioned 
these aspects during their interviews. Nevertheless, investors emphasized the importance of 
the potential zone’s development level and its infrastructural capacity. In general, companies 
have a wide range of choices among SEZs and industrial parks in the regions, which makes 
factors such as tax incentives and proximity to resources and markets secondary. The core 
element concerns providing infrastructure in the cluster’s territory; otherwise, the company 
must go through a very complicated and time-consuming procedure to establish everything in 
its own. SMEs prefer brownfield projects to access established real-estate infrastructure and 
to avoid costs on construction activities. Companies predominantly sell their goods either 
locally in the same region or in Russia. Export-oriented activities are not widespread, but they 
are expected to commence in the near future. To select an appropriate location for the 
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business, SMEs mainly investigate the markets of potential economic zones themselves, 
while MNEs use personal networks or participate in various consultations with state 
representatives.  
Industrial cluster model has been taken as a key theoretical framework for this research as 
its fundamentals comply with the development concepts of the SEZs and industrial parks 
(Aggarwal, 2011; Bräutigam & Tang, 2014; Hsu et al, 2013; Meng, 2003; Nel & Rogerson, 
2014; Zeng, 2012). The foundations of this model are the proximity of companies that 
cooperate and compete, launch knowledge and technology exchanges, and create innovation, 
all of which lead to a competitive advantage of a certain industry or a region (Delgado et al., 
2016; Ketels, 2013; Porter, 1990). Hence, competition and collaboration are crucial factors 
for the cluster’s sustainable development. The findings clearly demonstrate the absence of 
competition between companies within SEZs and industrial parks, as well as the lack of 
cooperative networks. Both parties seek to avoid a competitive environment within the 
cluster. Some investors do not come to a certain economic zone because of the existing rivals 
in it, or they negotiate with the managing company to avoid attracting companies that operate 
in the same market segment. The managing companies prefer to honor these requests or even 
do this job in advance without the investors’ appeals. Moreover, the respondents did not 
notice much active cooperation among the companies in the zone, and they did not manage to 
clarify the reasons for this lack of cooperation. According to the literature, the causes can be 
different, for instance, an inappropriate concept for the economic zone (Farole, 2011; Kirk, 
2014; Moberg, 2015; Yankov et al., 2016) or a major restriction of knowledge sharing and 
collaboration activities among firms due to the Russian mentality (Dickenson & Blundell, 
2000; Ivanov, 2016; Kuznetsova & Roud, 2014; Levin & Satarov, 2000; Longenecker & 
Popovski, 1994; Michailova & Husted, 2003). In general, investors come to clusters due to 
the basic laws of the market economy, which do not depend on the SEZ or industrial park 
models. According to the literature on cluster lifecycles and possible reasons for their 
extinction (Alberti, 2006; Boja, 2011; Porter, 1990; Swann & Prevezer, 1996), Russian 
economic zones and parks have pre-conditions that slow down development or even result in 
failure. 
After approximately ten years of implementation the SEZs and industrial parks, these 
projects remain immature and encounter many issues. The government’s approach to 
developing these initiatives implies a reliance on state interference in business processes and, 
in turn, the prevention of healthy competition and collaboration, which are crucial factors for 
a successful industrial cluster model. This approach will not result in innovation growth, 
which means that economic zones will not accomplish their intended objectives. The 
successful development of industrial cluster initiatives in Russia will require in-time funding 
from the federal government, a free-market approach to their establishment and development, 
better negotiations with potential investors regarding infrastructure preparation, and the 
implementation of appropriate regulations that can help attract foreign and local investors and 
trigger economic activity. 
Policymakers should initially construct economic zones with cluster features to improve 
industry competitiveness and innovation capacity in regions. The location of industrial 
clusters should be prioritized according to factors such as cost reduction, profitability growth, 
and performance improvement, instead of simply choosing regions in dire economic straits. 
Strategic alliances, competition, and collaboration must be based on resource sharing and 
integration. The state and cluster companies should establish collaborative principles, which 
facilitate mutual efforts in innovation and R&D and, in turn, enhance the international 
competitiveness of companies or industries. SEZs and industrial parks are expected to 
develop high value-added products and services and brace themselves for market challenges.  
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However, it should be taken into account that the findings regarding the perception of 
competition and collaboration among Russian state managers and entrepreneurs are of the 
nature of hypotheses. Data collection comprised in-depth semi-structured interviews and, 
hence, current research provides only an overall picture and understanding of the cluster 
phenomenon in the Russia’s context with the SEZs and industrial parks, as cases of analysis. 
This uninvestigated phenomenon, such as the emergence of industrial clusters in Russia, 
requires a more complex approach and calls for the use of multiple data collection methods 
and analyses. Further research would involve conducting interviews with SEZ tenants and 
industrial park representatives, the distribution of questionnaires, analyses of statistical data 
on the regions where these economic zones are established, and financial data on the 
companies based in the zones. Such research would enable the evaluation of the impact of 
these industrial clusters on economic development in the regions and would help determine 
whether they facilitate the development of the companies within these clusters. 
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